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ABSTRACT 
In some cases, singers have been able to vindicate property rights in their identities 
when advertisers have featured sound-alike singers in commercials. However, there 
is no case law to support that an instrumental musician can protect herself from an 
advertiser imitating the characteristic sound of her playing. This Comment will 
explore whether and how the law should protect “musical identities,” particularly 
when the plaintiff is an instrumental musician rather than a singer. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
uppose a major music store, Guitarz,1 advertises its Independence 
Day sale on television. The commercial shows a woman walking 
into a Guitarz store, picking a guitar off the rack, plugging it into an 
amplifier, and playing the “Star Spangled Banner” with sounds that are 
deliberately imitative of Jimi Hendrix’s famous Woodstock 
performance.2 She skillfully captures the distinctive tone of Hendrix’s 
delivery of the first few bars of the Anthem and then begins to imitate 
Hendrix’s dive-bomber sounds with stunning accuracy. The 
commercial gives viewers a front-row seat, showing the unknown 
guitarist actually creating these sounds with her fingers on the guitar. 
By featuring a guitarist imitating Hendrix’s sound in its 
commercial, has Guitarz misappropriated Jimi Hendrix’s identity? 
Midler v. Ford Motor Co.3 offers some support for such a theory.4 In 
Midler, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff Bette Midler made a 
showing, sufficient to defeat summary judgment, that the defendants 
had appropriated part of Midler’s identity by using another singer to 
imitate Midler’s voice for the soundtrack to a television commercial.5 
The court qualified its holding, stating, 
“We need not and do not go so far as to hold that every imitation 
of a voice to advertise merchandise is actionable. We hold only that 
                                                            
 
1 Guitarz is a fictional store. 
2 See JIMI HENDRIX, Star Spangled Banner, on WOODSTOCK: MUSIC FROM THE 
ORIGINAL SOUNDTRACK AND MORE (Cotillion/Atlantic Records 1970). Jimi 
Hendrix’s instrumental rendition of the “Star Spangled Banner” at Woodstock 
was particularly notable at the time because of its controversial use of unusual 
sounds. 
3 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). 
4 Not all states recognize postmortem rights in a person’s identity. See, e.g., 
Experience Hendrix LLC v. James Marshall Hendrix Found., 240 F. App’x 739, 
740 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding for limited purpose of appeal that “no posthumous 
right of publicity existed in New York at the time of Jimi Hendrix’s death”). 
Jimi Hendrix is featured in the Guitarz hypothetical purely as an example of a 
musician with a particularly identifiable musical sound. 
5 Midler, 849 F.2d at 463–64. Midler had turned down the defendants’ offer to 
sing for the commercial. Id. at 461. The song used in the commercial was “Do 
You Want to Dance?” written by Robert Freeman, which Bette Midler had sung 
on her 1973 album, “The Divine Miss M.” Id. The defendants had a license from 
the copyright holder to use the song. Id. 
S
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when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and 
deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have 
appropriated what is not theirs and have committed a tort in 
California.”6 
This Comment argues that an instrumental musician’s personally 
identifiable sound, like a singer’s unique voice, deserves protection 
from imitation by advertisers. 
But is Jimi Hendrix’s distinctive guitar sound, for example, 
comparable to a singer’s voice? In Midler, the court relied heavily 
upon the relationship between identity and the human voice, stating, 
“A voice is as distinctive and personal as a face. The human voice is 
one of the most palpable ways identity is manifested. . . . The singer 
manifests herself in the song. To impersonate her voice is to pirate her 
identity.”7 Based on the court’s reasoning, an instrumental musician’s 
“sound” could be something entirely different from a singer’s voice. A 
singing voice is closely related to an individual’s speaking voice 
because the sound emanates from the person’s unique vocal 
equipment, but sounds emanating from a musical instrument are 
related to the musician’s identity in a more abstract way because the 
musical instrument is not part of the musician’s body. Furthermore, 
almost all people are experienced at identifying other people by voice 
in everyday social interactions.8 However, identifying a musical soloist 
by sound is confined to the realm of musical appreciation, which, even 
for music enthusiasts, is a more limited aspect of daily life. Granted, 
many people can easily identify a musical group or a singer upon 
hearing a familiar recording. Yet, it is far more difficult to identify 
accurately a single instrumentalist on an unfamiliar recording, simply 
by the sound of her playing, without additional cues, such as a 
signature song or known associations with accompanying band 
members. 
Despite the inherent difficulty in identifying a musician by the 
sound of her playing, a musician with a particularly identifiable sound 
should have a right to protect her “musical identity” from imitation by 
advertisers. For example, innovative musicians, such as Jimi Hendrix, 
                                                            
 
6 Id. at 463. 
7 Id. 
8 See id. (“We are all aware that a friend is at once known by a few words on the 
phone.”). 
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Eddie Van Halen, and John Popper,9 have devoted tremendous time 
and energy into developing unique musical personalities.10 It is unfair 
for advertisers to exploit their creative efforts.11 
Part II of this Comment evaluates the pros and cons of protecting 
musical identities and discusses the background of voice imitation 
cases. Part III examines the causes of action that could protect against 
imitation of musical identities and discusses the limits of protection. 
Finally, Part IV concludes that public policy supports protection of 
musical identities and that, in most cases, the plaintiff should assert 
claims for false endorsement, misappropriation, and the right of 
publicity. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Why should musical identities be protected from imitation by 
advertisers? Additionally, if musical identities should be protected, 
how can the law achieve this? This Part explores the policy reasons 
and the legal foundations for recognizing this type of protection. 
A. Protecting Musical Identities 
If a musician can create a personally identifiable sound, that 
musician should have some degree of control over her creation. 
However, in many cases it might be very difficult to recognize a sound 
as belonging solely to one musician. This section considers these 
competing problems and weighs the pros and cons of protecting 
musical identities. 
1. Arguments in Favor of Protecting Musical Identities 
A musician develops a distinctive sound through talent, creativity, 
and innovation. The law should reward creativity and innovation in the 
arts in order to promote the growth of artistic expression.12 One way to 
reward creativity and innovation is to allow an artistic creator to 
                                                            
 
9 Eddie Van Halen is the influential guitarist for the rock band Van Halen. John 
Popper is the harmonica player and lead singer for the rock band Blues Traveler. 
10 See Edward T. Saadi, Sound Recordings Need Sound Protection, 5 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 333, 346 (1996). 
11 See Seth E. Bloom, Preventing the Misappropriation of Identity: Beyond the 
“Right of Publicity,” 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 489, 523–24 (1991). 
12 See Saadi, supra note 10, at 335. 
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control the use of her creations.13 When an artist has control of her 
work, she has a better chance to make a living in the arts.14 The law 
should reward a musician who creates a unique musical identity—i.e., 
characteristic “sound”—by allowing her to control the use of that 
creation. 
The law should not permit advertisers to profit unfairly from the 
innovative efforts of musicians.15 An advertiser imitates a musician’s 
sound because that sound in some way enhances the effectiveness of a 
particular advertisement.16 The advertiser benefits by using something 
that it took no part in creating.17 A musician who creates something 
original should be the one to control how it is used.18 Moreover, if the 
musician decides that the artistic value of the sound exceeds the 
present commercial value, the musician should be able to protect her 
sound from commercial exploitation.19 
2. Arguments Against Protecting Musical Identities 
Although protecting creative rights is a good thing, it must be 
recognized that musical creations are never one hundred percent 
original.20 A musician creates her sound out of countless musical 
influences.21 Granting exclusive rights to a particular style of playing 
may give a musician more control than she has earned.22 For example, 
a famous musician who models her sound after the playing of a lesser-
known musician perhaps does not deserve the right to claim ownership 
of a particular sound.23 If the same famous musician were to sue an 
                                                            
 
13 See id. 
14 See id. 
15 See Bloom, supra note 11, at 523–24. 
16 See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988). 
17 See Bloom, supra note 11, at 524. 
18 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5:50 (2d 
ed. 2007). 
19 Cf. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462–63. As the court stated, “Midler did not do 
television commercials.” Id. at 462. 
20 See Jill A. Phillips, Note, Performance Rights: Protecting a Performer’s Style, 
37 WAYNE L. REV. 1683, 1694 (1991). 
21 See Russell A. Stamets, Ain’t Nothin’ Like the Real Thing, Baby: The Right of 
Publicity and the Singing Voice, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 347, 371 (1993). 
22 See id. 
23 See id. 
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advertiser successfully for imitation of the musician’s sound, the 
famous musician would receive a windfall, whereas the lesser-known 
influence would receive nothing. 
Additionally, recognizing “musical identities” is problematic 
because they are difficult to identify with any significant degree of 
accuracy.24 If a musician imitates the sound of another musician, 
listeners are likely to disagree as to whose sound is being imitated 
because musical identities are necessarily fluid, changeable, and 
imprecise.25 Thus, some would argue that musical identities are 
unworkable from a legal standpoint because the law needs certainty;26 
otherwise, one cannot know what conduct is prohibited. 
Further, some would argue that a prohibition against musical 
imitation would punish creativity in advertising.27 Advertising 
certainly is an important form of communication. Thus, the law should 
give advertisers freedom to experiment with ideas in order to compete 
in the marketplace.28 If one subscribes to the notion that “unfixed” 
musical sounds29 defy the concept of ownership, then it would be 
unfair to deny advertisers the right to make use of such sounds.30 It is 
possible, for example, for an advertiser to use a sound more creatively 
than the musician who inspired the advertisement.31 If the advertiser 
can show that it has used certain sounds in a truly artistic way, the 




24 See id. at 372. 
25 Cf. MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 4:75 (“The crucial factual issue is whether 
the [playing] style is so distinctive that more than just a few aficionados could 
identify that sound as always linked with the plaintiff.”). 
26 See Stamets, supra note 21, at 372. 
27 See Bloom, supra note 11, at 526. 
28 See id. at 527. 
29 Cf. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (“A voice is not 
copyrightable. The sounds are not ‘fixed.’”). 
30 See Stamets, supra note 21, at 372. 
31 See Bloom, supra note 11, at 526. 
32 See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at §§ 8:72, 8:121. 
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3. The Benefits of Protecting Musical Identities Outweigh the 
Costs 
Despite the fact that musical sounds are often difficult to identify, 
the law should not permit advertisers to exploit musicians who succeed 
in creating sounds that are personally identifiable. Granted, musicians 
will always borrow from other musicians; this practice promotes the 
growth of musical expression. Musician 2 borrows from Musician 1; 
in turn, Musician 3 borrows from Musicians 2 and 1.33 The chain of 
inspiration is endless. However, advertisers do not contribute greatly 
to this process.34 When an advertiser borrows sounds from a musician, 
other musicians are far less likely to be inspired to expand upon the 
advertiser’s statement because the advertiser’s message is typically a 
commercial statement—”buy this product”—as opposed to an artistic 
statement. Thus, the advertiser does not hold a comparable place in the 
chain of shared musical expression. The creative musician inevitably 
replenishes the musical garden,35 but only occasionally does the 
advertiser return what it borrowed from the musician.36 
Granted, a creative musician might incorporate sounds from a 
commercial into a new artistic work. However, preventing advertisers 
from exploiting the identities of musical performers does not endanger 
the overall landscape of musical expression; it only forces a slightly 
higher standard of originality on advertisers, thus appropriately 
limiting exploitation without interfering with the ability of musical 
artists to imitate sounds and influence one another in the name of 
artistic expression. 
It is reasonable to incentivize musical creation at the expense of 
advertising. Artistic expression is inherently more valuable to society 
than commercial speech.37 Musicians use sounds to communicate 
ideas that are capable of profound meaning, whereas merchants 
primarily use advertisements to propose a commercial transaction.38 A 
                                                            
 
33 See Phillips, supra note 20, at 1694. 
34 See Bloom, supra note 11, at 524. 
35 Cf. MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 5:50. 
36 See Bloom, supra note 11, at 524. 
37 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (recognizing that 
commercial speech occupies a “subordinate position in the scale of First 
Amendment values”). 
38 See id. 
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merchant does not lose its voice in the marketplace if prohibited from 
imitating musicians.39 However, a musician’s reputational value, like a 
singer’s, may be damaged by having her sound used in an 
advertisement.40 The law should protect musicians from commercial 
exploitation. 
B. Voice Imitation Case Law 
Because there is no case law for protection of instrumental musical 
identities, an instrumental musician suing an advertiser would have to 
rely on the cases involving “sound-alike” singers for support.41 
1. Bert Lahr 
One of the earliest voice imitation cases was the 1962 case of Lahr 
v. Adell Chemical Co.42 Bert Lahr was a professional entertainer, well 
known for his comedic voice.43 The First Circuit Court stated, 
“According to the complaint the plaintiff . . . has achieved stardom—
with commensurate financial success—on the legitimate stage, in 
motion pictures, on radio, television and other entertainment media 
throughout the United States, Canada and elsewhere.”44 The court 
seemed to acknowledge that Lahr had achieved substantial success in 
the entertainment field “because his ‘style of vocal comic delivery 
which, by reason of its distinctive and original combination of pitch, 
inflection, accent and comic sounds,’ has caused him to become 
                                                            
 
39 The merchant’s competitors are similarly limited. Cf. Coca-Cola Co. v. Proctor 
& Gamble Co., 822 F.2d 28, 31 (6th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that public policy is 
“well served” by allowing competitors to enforce false advertising claims). 
Additionally, freedom of speech ensures that an advertiser has a valid defense if 
it can show artistic value. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
40 Cf. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1103–06 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming 
damages award for injury to plaintiff’s peace, happiness, and feelings and for 
injury to his goodwill, professional standing, and future publicity value). 
41 See generally Waits, 978 F.2d 1093; Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 
(9th Cir. 1988); Prima v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337 (D.N.J. 
2000). 
42 Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962); see MCCARTHY, supra 
note 18, at § 4:77. 
43 Lahr, 300 F.2d at 257. 
44 Id. 
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‘widely known and readily recognized as a unique and extraordinary 
comic character.’”45 
Lahr alleged that the defendants hired an actor to imitate Lahr’s 
voice in a television commercial for Lestoil household cleaner.46 The 
commercial featured a cartoon duck with a comedic voice.47 Lahr 
brought three causes of action—unfair competition, invasion of 
privacy, and defamation—alleging that “the ‘vast public television 
audience and the entertainment industry’ throughout the United States, 
Canada and elsewhere believed that the words spoken and the comic 
sounds made by the cartoon duck were supplied and made by the 
plaintiff.”48 Lahr’s complaint alleged further “that this was 
misappropriation of the plaintiff’s ‘creative talent, voice, vocal sounds 
and vocal comic delivery’ and a ‘trading upon his fame and 
renown.’”49 In addition, Lahr claimed that the defendants’ commercial 
injured his “reputation in the entertainment field, both because it 
cheapened plaintiff to indicate that he was reduced to giving 
anonymous television commercials and because the imitation, 
although recognizable, was inferior in quality and suggested that his 
abilities had deteriorated.”50 
The trial court had dismissed the complaint for failure to state a 
cause of action.51 On appeal, the First Circuit analyzed each of Lahr’s 
three claims individually to determine whether the case could continue 
on remand.52 First, the court determined that the trial court was correct 
to dismiss the invasion of privacy claim.53 The court applied 
Massachusetts law and New York law, Lahr having agreed that the 
court need not consider the laws of any but those two states regarding 
his claims.54 The court determined that Lahr did not have a claim for 






48 Id. (quoting the complaint). 
49 Id. at 257–58. 
50 Id. at 258. 
51 Id. at 257. 
52 Id. at 258–59. 
53 Id. at 258. 
54 Id. 
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Massachusetts did not recognize invasion of privacy as a tort.55 
Additionally, the court determined that Lahr did not have a claim for 
invasion of privacy under New York law because the New York “right 
of privacy statute” covered commercial uses “of a party’s ‘name, 
portrait or picture.’”56 The court was not willing to extend “name, 
portrait, or picture” to include “voice.”57 
Next, regarding Lahr’s defamation claim, the court took issue with 
Lahr’s “assertion that an inferior imitation damaged his reputation,” 
stating that it raised a “doubtful question.”58 The court stated, 
If every time one can allege, “Your (anonymous) commercial 
sounded like me, but not so good,” and contend the public 
believed, in spite of the variance, that it was he, and at the same 
time believed, because of the variance, that his abilities had 
declined, the consequences would be too great to contemplate. 
Occasional disparagement of public entertainers is the commonly 
accepted lot. Furthermore, there is no absolute test of excellence in 
dramatic performance. If what was attributed to the plaintiff was so 
manifestly inferior as to constitute actionable defamation, we hold 
he must be able to point to some identification with himself more 
specific than the remaining similarities. We know of no case which 
gives a plaintiff such liberty to put a cap on and at the same time 
say it does not fit.59 
Nevertheless, the court ultimately found Lahr’s defamation claim to be 
meritorious, stating, “A charge that an entertainer has stooped to 
perform below his class may be found to damage his reputation. 
Plaintiff’s allegations in this respect are not insufficient.”60 
Because the court held that Lahr had stated a cause of action for 
defamation, the court vacated the judgment of the trial court and 
remanded the case for further proceedings.61 However, the court also 




56 Id. (quoting N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2012)). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 259. 
59 Id. (citation omitted). 
60 Id. at 258–59 (citation omitted). Lahr alleged that the defendant’s commercial 
injured his “reputation in the entertainment field . . . because it cheapened 
plaintiff to indicate that he was reduced to giving anonymous television 
commercials.” Id. at 258. 
61 Id. at 258–60. 
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claim.62 The court conceded that “imitation is not unfair 
competition . . . if there is no confusion of source,” but where Lahr 
alleged that the defendants’ commercial caused a “mistake in identity,” 
the court was receptive to Lahr’s argument that the defendants were 
“stealing his thunder” by “copying his material” in such a way that 
viewers of the commercial believed they were “listening to him.”63 
The court went on to say, 
      Furthermore, we can hardly agree with defendant that “there is 
no competitive interest or purpose served and no real confusion of 
product which would lead to the appellant’s loss of opportunity in 
the entertainment field.” It could well be found that defendant’s 
conduct saturated plaintiff’s audience to the point of curtailing his 
market. No performer has an unlimited demand. . . . [W]e might 
hesitate to say that an ordinary singer whose voice, deliberately or 
otherwise, sounded sufficiently like another to cause confusion 
was not free to do so. [However,] Plaintiff here alleges a peculiar 
style and type of performance, unique in a far broader sense.64 
Thus, the court found that Lahr had stated a cause of action for unfair 
competition.65 
2. Nancy Sinatra 
Eight years after Lahr, in Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 
the Ninth Circuit decided a voice imitation case where the plaintiff 
claimed unfair competition. The Ninth Circuit distinguished Lahr and 
affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants.66 The plaintiff 
was singer Nancy Sinatra, who had become popular with her recording 
of the song, “These Boots Are Made for Walkin’,” which was written 
and copyrighted by singer-songwriter Lee Hazelwood.67 The 
defendants, having first acquired a license from the copyright holder, 
used a recording of “These Boots Are Made for Walkin’,” sung by an 
unidentified female singer, as part of a “wide boots”-themed 
                                                            
 




66 Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 713, 715–16 (9th Cir. 
1970). 
67 Id. at 712–13. 
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advertising campaign for Goodyear tires.68 The defendants’ television 
commercials featured “four girls dressed in high boots,” along with 
footage of rolling tires, while the song “These Boots” played in the 
background.69 
Sinatra alleged that she had “so popularized” the song that her 
name was “identified with it” and that she was “best known by her 
connection with the song.”70 According to Sinatra’s complaint, after an 
unsuccessful attempt to employ her for the Goodyear campaign, the 
defendants instead “selected a singer whose voice and style was 
deliberately intended to imitate” her voice and style.71 Sinatra alleged 
that the defendants used the imitative version of the song, while 
showing “fleeting views” of girls utilizing Sinatra’s “mannerisms and 
dress,” in order to “deceiv[e] the public into believing that [Sinatra] 
was a participant in the commercials.”72 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the trial court that there was “‘no 
audio or visual representation, holding out, or inference that any of the 
commercials embody the performance or voice of any particular 
individual or individuals’” and therefore the defendants “‘did not 
mislead the public into thinking their commercials were the product of 
plaintiff or anyone else.’”73 
Sinatra argued that her claim ought to be decided based on the 
reasoning in Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., where the First Circuit found 
unfair competition based on confusion over the source of the singing 
voice and interference with the plaintiff’s market.74 However, the 
Ninth Circuit was not persuaded by Sinatra’s reliance on Lahr.75 The 
court stated, “There is no competition between Nancy Sinatra and 
Goodyear Tire Company. Appellant is not in the tire business and 
Goodyear is not selling phonograph records.”76 Additionally, the court 




69 Id. at 712. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 712–13. 
72 Id. at 712. 
73 Id. at 713 (quoting trial court). 
74 Id. at 715–16; see Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1962). 
75 See Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 716. 
76 Id. at 714. 
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Lahr’s claim for two reasons.77 First, whereas “Lahr was decided on 
the basis of a singular uniqueness of quality of voice,” Sinatra did not 
allege that “her sound was uniquely personal.”78 
Second, whereas the defendants in Lahr “were not dealing in 
materials in which the defendants had a copyright,” the sounds sought 
to be protected by Sinatra—”the music, lyrics and arrangement, which 
made her the subject of popular identification”—were licensed to the 
defendants for use in the tire commercials.79 The court seized upon this 
second distinction as further justification for affirming summary 
judgment, stating that a state may not enforce its unfair competition 
laws when enforcement would “clash” with federal copyright.80 The 
court added, 
Here, the defendants had paid a very substantial sum to the 
copyright proprietor to obtain the license for the use of the song 
and all of its arrangements. The plaintiff had not sought or 
obtained [the right to control the use of the song]. The resulting 
clash with federal law seems inevitable if damages or injunctive 
remedies are available under state laws. Moreover, the inherent 
difficulty of protecting or policing a “performance” or the creation 
of a performer in handling copyrighted material licensed to another 
imposes problems of supervision that are almost impossible for a 
court of equity. 
      An added clash with the copyright laws is the potential 
restriction . . . upon the potential market of the copyright 
proprietor. If a proposed licensee must pay each artist who has 
played or sung the composition and who might therefore claim 
unfair competition-performer’s protection, the licensee may well 
be discouraged to the point of complete loss of interest.81 
Thus, at the time, the Ninth Circuit showed a profound reluctance to 
interfere with the domain of federal copyright law.82 
                                                            
 
77 See id. at 716. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 717 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-33 
(1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964)). 
81 Id. at 717–18 (footnote omitted). 
82 See id. 
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3. Bette Midler 
Eighteen years after Sinatra, in Midler v. Ford Motor Co., the 
Ninth Circuit held that Midler’s claim against the defendant for 
imitating her voice was distinguishable from Sinatra’s claim.83 The 
court stated, 
If Midler were claiming a secondary meaning to “Do You Want To 
Dance” or seeking to prevent the defendants from using that song, 
she would fail like Sinatra. But that is not this case. Midler does 
not seek damages for Ford’s use of “Do You Want To Dance,” and 
thus her claim is not preempted by federal copyright law. 
Copyright protects “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression.” A voice is not copyrightable. The 
sounds are not “fixed.” What is put forward as protectible [sic] 
here is more personal than any work of authorship.84 
Unlike Sinatra, Midler was able to show that her voice was unique.85 
Thus, the court found Midler’s claim to be more like Lahr’s claim.86 
However, the court did not find unfair competition, stating, “One-
minute commercials of the sort the defendants put on would not have 
saturated Midler’s audience and curtailed her market. Midler did not 
do television commercials. The defendants were not in competition 
with her.”87 
Midler marked a significant turning point.88 The Ninth Circuit 
reversed the trial court’s summary judgment ruling, allowing Midler to 
pursue her claim against the defendants for impersonating the sound of 
her voice in a commercial.89 The court found that imitation for 
advertising purposes of a widely known singer’s distinctive voice 
interferes with the singer’s “proprietary interest” in her own identity.90 
The court’s ruling signaled that a plaintiff suing over the use of a 
                                                            
 
83 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988). 
84 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012)). 
85 See id. at 463–64; Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 716. 
86 Midler, 849 F.2d at 462 (“Lahr alleged that his style of vocal delivery was 
distinctive in pitch, accent, inflection, and sounds.”); see Lahr v. Adell Chem. 
Co., 300 F.2d 256, 257, 259 (1st Cir. 1962). 
87 Midler, 849 F.2d at 462–63 (citing Halicki v. United Artists Commc’ns, Inc., 
812 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
88 See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 4:78. 
89 Midler, 849 F.2d at 463–64. 
90 See id. 
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sound-alike singer in an advertisement might find broader protection 
than similar plaintiffs had found in the past when those plaintiffs had 
relied on such theories as unfair competition, invasion of privacy, and 
defamation.91 Starting with Midler, and continuing soon afterwards 
with Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., and more recently with Prima v. Darden 
Restaurants, Inc., singer-plaintiffs have instead sought protection 
under such theories as misappropriation, right of publicity, and false 
endorsement.92 However, despite the fact that some courts have 
recognized a unique singer’s right to be protected from imitations by 
advertisers, it remains to be seen whether instrumental musicians can 
find similar protection.93 
III. THEORIES AND LIMITATIONS OF RECOVERY 
The Midler case was a step in the right direction. This Part 
examines what causes of action might be available in a case against an 
advertiser for imitation of a musician’s “sound.” 
A. False Endorsement—The Lanham Act 
False endorsement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act would 
be an appropriate way to protect against misuse of a musician’s unique 
sound if an advertiser uses a sound-alike musician to deceive 
consumers into thinking that the musician endorses the product.94 Not 
long after Midler, singer Tom Waits sued Frito-Lay for voice 
misappropriation and false endorsement.95 Frito-Lay had advertised 
SalsaRio Doritos in a radio commercial, using a song written for the 
commercial, which “echoed the rhyming word play” of Tom Waits’s 
song “Step Right Up,” sung in the commercial by a singer imitating 
                                                            
 
91 Cf. MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at §§ 4:77, 4:78. In Lahr, the court reversed 
dismissal of Lahr’s unfair competition claim. Lahr, 300 F.2d at 260. However, 
Midler shows that unfair competition offers limited protection if the singer is an 
artist who does not do commercials. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 462–63. 
92 See discussion infra Part III. See generally Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 
1093 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler, 849 F.2d at 460; Prima v. Darden Restaurants, 
Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337 (D.N.J. 2000). 
93 See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 4:75. 
94 Cf. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1106–11 (affirming that imitation of singer’s voice was 
actionable under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act). 
95 Id. at 1097. 
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Tom Waits’s distinctive vocal delivery.96 The jury awarded Waits over 
two million dollars in damages, which the Ninth Circuit largely 
affirmed.97 Waits’s Lanham Act claim was premised on the theory that 
people hearing the commercial would think that he endorsed the 
defendant’s product.98 Although Waits involved a singing voice, 
distinctive instrumental sounds in a commercial might also mislead 
people to believe that a particular musician endorsed the advertised 
product. 
1. Policy Behind Enforcement of False Endorsement Claims 
The policy behind enforcement of false endorsement claims is to 
prevent unfair competition in order to protect consumers from inferior 
products.99 If the law did not protect consumers from misleading 
endorsements, a company selling an inferior product could potentially 
gain an unfair advantage in the marketplace by tricking consumers into 
trusting an endorsement that does not exist.100 The result then would 
be an increase in consumers receiving inferior goods. To avoid this 
result, the law allows a competitor to sue the false endorser.101 Thus, 
enforcement of false endorsement claims under the Lanham Act serves 
the policy of protecting consumers by deterring merchants from using 
false endorsements. 
2. Protection of Musical Identities Under the Lanham Act 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act “‘permits celebrities to vindicate 
property rights in their identities against allegedly misleading 
commercial use by others.’”102 Does it follow therefore that the 
Lanham Act protects musical identities? Waits seems to suggest that 
                                                            
 
96 Id. at 1097–98. 
97 Id. at 1098, 1112. The court vacated a portion of the Lanham Act damages as 
duplicative. Id. at 1112. 
98 Id. at 1106. 
99 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 1:23 (4th ed. 2009). 
100 See id. 
101 See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1110 (recognizing plaintiff’s standing as a competitor 
because plaintiff and defendant “compete with respect to the use of the 
celebrity’s name or identity”). 
102 MCCARTHY, supra note 99, at § 28:15 (quoting Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 
F.3d 437, 459 (6th Cir. 2003)). 
2014 Misappropriation of an Instrumental Musician’s Identity 377 
the answer is yes.103 However, in Waits, Frito-Lay misled consumers 
by imitating Waits’s singing voice.104 It remains an open question 
whether use of “unfixed” instrumental sounds105 could amount to false 
endorsement. 
In order to find that a defendant has infringed upon a celebrity’s 
identity by way of false endorsement under section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, most courts require a likelihood of deception regarding 
the celebrity’s association with the defendant’s product.106 For 
example, in Waits, the trial court had instructed the jury to consider 
“whether ‘ordinary consumers . . . would be confused as to whether 
Tom Waits sang on the commercial . . . and whether he sponsors or 
endorses SalsaRio Doritos.’”107 The same instruction would be 
appropriate where a commercial features an imitation of an 
instrumentalist rather than a singer. However, because it is perhaps 
more difficult to link instrumental sounds to a particular musician than 
to link vocal sounds to a particular singer,108 the instrumentalist might 
be hard-pressed to establish a likelihood of deception. 
3. Likelihood of Deception 
On the issue of whether Frito-Lay’s commercial caused a 
likelihood of deception regarding Waits’s endorsement, the trial court 
instructed the jury to “consider the totality of the evidence, including 
the distinctiveness of Waits’ voice and style, the evidence of actual 
confusion as to whether Waits actually sang on the commercial, and 
                                                            
 
103 See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1111 (holding that plaintiff’s “evidence was sufficient to 
support the jury’s finding that consumers were likely to be misled by the 
commercial into believing that Waits endorsed SalsaRio Doritos”). 
104 Id. at 1106. 
105 Cf. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (describing a 
singing voice as not “fixed”). Midler did not include a Lanham Act claim. 
106 See MCCARTHY, supra note 99, at § 28:15. Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham 
Act prohibits a false representation which is “likely to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of 
such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of 
his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person.” 15 
U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). 
107 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1110–11 (quoting trial court). 
108 See Stamets, supra note 21, at 372 (“Legal intrusion into the world of pure 
sound . . . is simply unworkable.”). 
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the defendants’ intent to imitate Waits’ voice.”109 Consideration of 
these same factors would be necessary to determine whether use of 
instrumental sounds could cause a likelihood of deception. First, the 
musician must have a distinctive sound; otherwise, people would not 
be deceived.110 Second, evidence of people actually deceived certainly 
would tend to show a likelihood of deception.111 Third, evidence of the 
defendant’s intent to imitate the musician’s sound would tend to 
implicate the defendant in an act of falsity.112 
In the Jimi Hendrix hypothetical presented earlier, a false 
endorsement claim would differ from the false endorsement claim in 
Waits.113 In the hypothetical, Guitarz attempted to disclaim the 
element of falsity by clearly showing the woman creating the sounds 
on the guitar.114 Thus, despite the close imitation of Hendrix’s 
distinctive sound, perhaps viewers would not be deceived into thinking 
that the commercial actually featured Hendrix’s guitar playing. 
However, the plaintiff could still establish a false endorsement claim 
by showing that viewers would likely be deceived into thinking that 
the defendant had obtained a license to imitate Hendrix’s sound, but 
this could be a difficult argument to prove because viewers may not 
think that an advertiser needs a license to imitate instrumental 
sounds.115 
Overall, a false endorsement claim under section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act could be an effective way for a musician to protect 
against misuse of her unique instrumental sound. Enforcement of such 
claims comports with the policy of deterring unfair competition by 
subjecting false endorsers to lawsuits.116 At the same time, because a 
                                                            
 
109 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1111. 
110 See id. 
111 See id. 
112 See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 3:10. 
113 See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1111 (affirming the jury’s finding that the defendants 
actively deceived consumers). 
114 See supra Part I. 
115 Cf. Fifty-Six Hope Road Music, Ltd., v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 688 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 
1170 (D. Nev. 2010) (discussing the value of surveys, such as one that asked 
people whether a “t-shirt maker received permission from someone to put out [a] 
t-shirt” featuring Bob Marley’s likeness). 
116 See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
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musician must prove a likelihood of deception,117 successful suits 
would be limited to situations where an advertiser imitates a musician 
with a particularly unique instrumental sound. 
B. The Misappropriation Doctrine 
In Midler, the court held that Midler could show that the 
defendants had misappropriated her identity by imitating her singing 
voice in a commercial.118 In Waits, the court affirmed the defendants’ 
liability under the same theory.119 Perhaps an instrumental musician 
could rely on the misappropriation doctrine to protect against misuse 
of her musical identity. The biggest question is whether instrumental 
sounds can truly evoke the musician’s identity.120 
1. Value Protected by the Misappropriation Doctrine 
According to Professor J. Thomas McCarthy, the misappropriation 
doctrine “is usually invoked by a plaintiff who has what he considers a 
valuable commercial ‘thing’ which he sees another has taken or 
appropriated at little cost.”121 McCarthy described the 
misappropriation doctrine as “a kind of residual legal theory which 
may prevail where the taking by defendant is egregiously ‘unfair.’”122 
The defendant’s taking is unfair because the plaintiff has made a 
“substantial investment of time, effort and money into creating the 
thing misappropriated such that the court can characterize that ‘thing’ 
as a kind of property right.”123 
2. Misappropriation—Singing Voices and Beyond 
In Midler, the court reasoned that, by imitating Midler’s singing 
voice, the defendants had potentially interfered with Midler’s 
proprietary interest in her own identity.124 The court established the 
                                                            
 
117 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
118 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463–64 (9th Cir. 1988). 
119 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1112 (9th Cir. 1992). 
120 See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 4:75 (“The crucial factual issue is whether 
the [playing] style is so distinctive that more than just a few aficionados could 
identify that sound as always linked with the plaintiff.”). 
121 See id. at § 5:50. 
122 See id. 
123 See id. 
124 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463–64 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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following elements for voice misappropriation: (1) the singer’s voice 
is distinctive; (2) the singer is widely known; and (3) the defendant 
deliberately imitated the singer’s voice to sell a product.125 However, 
because the court relied so heavily upon the identifiable aspects of the 
human voice,126 it is unclear whether the same elements would apply 
where a defendant imitates an instrumental musician. 
A musician who works hard to create a uniquely innovative 
instrumental sound no doubt considers her sound to be a “valuable 
commercial ‘thing.’”127 Thus, some might consider it unfair for an 
advertiser to imitate the musician’s sound. However, the 
misappropriation doctrine would fail to protect the musician-plaintiff if 
a court determines that a performer does not have a proprietary interest 
in “unfixed” instrumental sounds.128 Potentially, a court could reason 
that imitation of a widely known musician’s distinctive instrumental 
sound is not actionable because such sounds, unlike the human 
voice,129 do not truly represent the musician’s identity. 
In the Jimi Hendrix hypothetical, Guitarz deliberately imitated 
Hendrix’s distinctive guitar sound.130 Hendrix certainly developed his 
sound through creative innovation. Thus, it may be unfair for Guitarz 
to use the sound of Jimi Hendrix without permission. The 
misappropriation doctrine applies if the “Jimi Hendrix sound” is a 
representation of Hendrix’s identity and is therefore “a kind of 
property right.”131 In the hypothetical, the woman closely imitated 
sounds from a very notable moment in twentieth century popular 
culture—Hendrix’s controversial rendition of the national anthem.132 
As a result, those sounds evoke an unmistakable image of Jimi 
                                                            
 
125 Id. Although the Midler court did not use the term “voice misappropriation,” the 
term appears prominently in Waits. See generally Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 
F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992). 
126 See Midler, 849 F.2d at 463. 
127 See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 5:50. 
128 But cf. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1103–06 (holding that defendants, who had imitated 
Waits’s voice and compositional style, had misappropriated the singer’s 
proprietary interest in the sound of his voice). 
129 Cf. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 (relying on the particularly identifiable aspects of 
the human voice). 
130 See supra Part I. 
131 See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 5:50. 
132 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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Hendrix. In such a case, the law should protect the musician’s right to 
control the commercial use of his identity.133 The misappropriation 
doctrine would be an appropriate way for a court to protect that right. 
C. The Right of Publicity 
In Waits, the court referred to voice misappropriation as “a species 
of violation of the ‘right of publicity,’ the right of a person whose 
identity has commercial value—most often a celebrity—to control the 
commercial use of that identity.”134 However, right-of-publicity cases 
do not necessarily depend on the misappropriation doctrine.135 For 
example, in Prima v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., singer Louis Prima’s 
widow sued Darden Restaurants for imitating Prima’s singing voice in 
a television commercial.136 The court held that Prima’s widow had 
established a prima facie case of violation of her right of publicity in 
her late husband’s identity.137 Thus, it seems the right of publicity 
could potentially protect an instrumental musician’s personally 
identifiable sound without depending on the misappropriation doctrine. 
1. Policies Supporting the Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity is considered a “natural right of property.”138 
A person shapes her own identity by the choices she makes in life. 
Thus, it is only fair that she be the one to control the commercial use 
of her identity.139 Moreover, if she chooses to be a part of public life in 
some way, such as through the arts, the law should promote her 
contribution to society.140 By protecting a person’s commercial interest 
in her identity, the right of publicity provides incentive to those who 
contribute to public life.141 
                                                            
 
133 But see supra note 4. 
134 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1992). 
135 See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 5:48 (“The right of publicity can now stand 
on its own feet, independent of its early legal origins.”). 
136 Prima v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337, 341 (D.N.J. 2000). 
137 Id. at 350. 
138 See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 2:1. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. at § 2:6. 
141 See id. 
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2. The Issue of “Identification” 
According to Professor McCarthy, the prima facie case for a right 
of publicity claim involves the following two elements: (1) validity—
plaintiff owns an enforceable right in a person’s identity; and (2) 
infringement—defendant used some aspect of that identity without 
permission.142 McCarthy wrote, “To trigger liability for infringement 
of the right of publicity, the plaintiff must be ‘identifiable’ from 
defendant’s usage. . . . [However, t]he law has yet to define clearly the 
line between infringing ‘identification’ on the one hand and 
noninfringing ‘reminders’ and ‘hints’ on the other hand.”143 
In Midler and in Waits, the Ninth Circuit enforced the right of 
publicity through application of the misappropriation doctrine. 
However, in Prima, the district court instead simply applied the two 
“McCarthy elements” directly.144 With either approach, identification 
will likely be the central issue in cases involving infringement via 
sounds.145 In Midler, the court alluded to the issue of identification, 
referring to the fact that many people who heard the defendants’ 
commercial thought that Midler’s was the voice on the soundtrack.146 
However, in Waits, the court declined to express an opinion on 
whether it was essential that listeners believed Waits actually sang on 
the commercial.147 
In Prima, the plaintiff alleged that the voice on the commercial 
sounded like Louis Prima and that the defendant had imitated Prima’s 
voice.148 If the Prima case had gone to trial, the court would have had 
to consider whether the sounds in the commercial truly evoked the 
identity of Louis Prima. If the plaintiff could have shown that Prima’s 
voice had distinctive qualities sufficient to distinguish his voice from 
                                                            
 
142 Id. at § 3:2. 
143 Id. at § 3:7. 
144 See Prima v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (D.N.J. 2000) 
(citing McCarthy’s treatise). 
145 Cf. Stamets, supra note 21, at 372 (positing that identity through sound is an 
unworkable concept). 
146 See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461–62 (9th Cir. 1988). 
147 See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1101 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1992). 
148 See Prima, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 350. 
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that of all other singers149 and that defendant’s commercial imitated 
those qualities, the plaintiff could have proven a violation of the right 
of publicity, assuming she owned that right.150 
Similarly, in the Jimi Hendrix hypothetical, whether the plaintiff 
asserts misappropriation or the right of publicity, the plaintiff would 
have to prove that Hendrix’s persona was identifiable from the 
defendant’s usage. Certainly, Hendrix had a distinctive guitar sound. 
Arguably, his sound was sufficiently distinctive as to distinguish him 
from all other guitar players.151 Yet, very few musicians are likely to 
have such a distinctive sound.152 Nevertheless, the law should 
recognize musical identities under the right of publicity where the 
musician has chosen to contribute to the arts by inventing a sound that 
people can recognize as personally identifiable.153 
D. Limitations on What Constitutes a Personally Identifiable 
Sound 
If the law is to recognize musical identities, there must be some 
way of differentiating between sounds that are capable of identifying a 
particular person and sounds that are too abstract to warrant protection 
from unauthorized use.154 This section examines the limits of 
protection for musical identities. 
                                                            
 
149 Courts have yet to establish whether identification requires the plaintiff to be 
distinguished from all others. See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 3:7. 
150 See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 3:2. 
151 Cf. id. at § 3:7 (“[A]ttributes of plaintiff such as a unique vocal style, a 
distinguishing setting, appearance and mannerisms, or a distinctive introduction 
by another may all, alone or in combination, serve to identify and distinguish the 
plaintiff from all others.”). 
152 See id. at § 4:75 (suggesting that a plaintiff may find that “just a few 
aficionados” are able to identify instrumental sounds “as always linked with the 
plaintiff”). 
153 See discussion supra Part III.C.1. 
154 See Kathleen Birkel Dangelo, Note, How Much of You Do You Really Own? A 
Property Right in Identity, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 499, 522 (1989). 
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1. A Performer’s Musical “Style” 
In Waits, the court indicated, in dicta, that imitation of Waits’s 
“style” would not have been sufficient to infringe upon his identity.155 
A musician’s “style” of singing or playing develops in part through 
inspiration from countless musical influences; thus, a musician’s style 
of singing or playing is not likely to identify her to the exclusion of all 
other musicians.156 However, “style” is a broad term, which 
inadequately describes what a performer with a particularly unique 
“sound” communicates through her instrument.157 For example, an 
innovative lead guitarist develops a personally identifiable sound by 
having a distinctive tone and great dexterity, by using unique phrasing 
and unusual combinations of musical scales, and by integrating diverse 
musical influences. The more innovative the musician, the more her 
sound is personally identifiable. A personally identifiable “sound” is 
something more than mere “style” of playing. 
2. Exclusive Rights to Musical Sounds 
The Ninth Circuit recognized that Tom Waits effectively owned 
the right to exclude advertisers from imitating the sound of his unique 
voice.158 However, some other courts have been reluctant to recognize 
exclusive rights to musical sounds.159 In Miller v. Universal Pictures 
                                                            
 
155 See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 1992). In closing 
arguments at trial, even Waits’s attorney agreed that style was not protected. See 
id. 
156 See Phillips, supra note 20, at 1694. 
157 Cf. Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 257, 259 (1st Cir. 1962) (holding 
that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for unfair competition by alleging 
that the defendants imitated the plaintiff’s unique style of vocal comic delivery 
in a commercial featuring a cartoon duck with a comedic voice). The Lahr court 
used the term “style,” perhaps for lack of a more precise word, to refer to a 
collection of very specific attributes of the plaintiff’s voice; the court referred to 
Lahr’s style of vocal comic delivery as a “‘distinctive and original combination 
of pitch, inflection, accent and comic sounds.’” Id. at 257 (quoting Lahr’s 
complaint). 
158 See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100, 1112. The court stated, “Waits’ voice 
misappropriation claim is one for invasion of a personal property right: his right 
of publicity to control the use of his identity as embodied in his voice.” Id. at 
1100 (citing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462–63 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
159 See, e.g., Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., 201 N.Y.S.2d 632, 634 (1st Dep’t 
1960), aff’d, 180 N.E.2d 248, 248 (N.Y. 1961); Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 341 
N.E.2d 817, 820 (N.Y. 1975) (citing Miller, 201 N.Y.S. at 634, aff’d, 180 
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Co., the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the ruling of the 
Appellate Division that the defendant had not interfered with a 
property interest by imitating the sound of the Glenn Miller orchestra 
on records from the soundtrack to a film.160 The Appellate Division 
stated, “Plaintiff never had, and certainly does not now have, any 
property interests in the Glenn Miller ‘sound’. Indeed, in the absence 
of palming off or confusion, even while Glenn Miller was alive, others 
might have meticulously duplicated or imitated his renditions.”161 
Similarly, in Shaw v. Time-Life Records, the Court of Appeals of New 
York stated that bandleader Artie Shaw did not have a property 
interest in the “Artie Shaw ‘sound.’”162 
Aside from the statutory issues in Miller and in Shaw,163 a 
bandleader’s distinctive sound is fundamentally different from the 
musical identity of a lead singer or featured soloist. A bandleader 
achieves a unique sound by combining different instruments and 
different players. Thus, the listener hears much more than the sound of 
the bandleader’s artistry; the listener hears a sound comprised of the 
personal talents of each band member. Although the bandleader has 
directive control, the individual band musicians nevertheless control 
the physical act of producing sounds from their instruments. 
By contrast, a lead vocal performance or featured solo stands out 
above the accompanying music. The lead singer’s role, as well as the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
N.E.2d at 248); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 4:75 (stating that the 
New York cases, such as Miller and Shaw, are “complicated by the narrow 
definitions of the New York privacy statute and the general, but not uniform, 
unwillingness of New York state courts to venture beyond the statute.”). The 
New York privacy statute prohibits the unauthorized commercial use of a living 
person’s name, portrait, or picture. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 
2012). However, the statute contains several exclusions, such as when an artist 
has conveyed certain rights to a work. See CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (“[N]othing 
contained in this article shall be so construed as to prevent any person, firm or 
corporation . . . from using the name, portrait, picture or voice of any author, 
composer or artist in connection with his literary, musical or artistic productions 
which he has sold or disposed of with such name, portrait, picture or voice used 
in connection therewith.”). 
160 See Miller, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 634, aff’d, 180 N.E.2d at 248. 
161 Miller, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 634; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 4:75 
(quoting Miller, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 634). 
162 Shaw, 341 N.E.2d at 820 (citing Miller, 201 N.Y.S. at 634, aff’d, 180 N.E.2d at 
248). 
163 See supra note 159. 
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soloist’s, is to invite the listener to hear a personal message which the 
performer communicates directly through her voice or instrument to 
the listener. Therefore, a featured soloist, more so than a bandleader, 
exhibits her identity through musical performance. The ever-looming 
question—in a case against an advertiser that used a “sound-alike” 
musician—is whether the plaintiff’s instrumental sound can be 
perceived as something uniquely personal to the plaintiff, such that the 
law would recognize the plaintiff’s right to claim that sound as her 
own.164 Considering the difficulties in identifying an instrumental 
soloist by sound, it is likely that very few musicians could be 
successful in claiming such a right. Nevertheless, a musician with a 
particularly identifiable sound should be able to vindicate her rights 
against an advertiser who imitates her sound. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The law should recognize that an instrumental musician with a 
uniquely identifiable sound has a proprietary interest in that sound as 
an aspect of the musician’s identity.165 By imitating the musician’s 
sound, an advertiser infringes upon the musician’s right to control the 
commercial use of the musician’s identity.166 Where the advertiser’s 
use is deceptive, a claim for false endorsement could be appropriate.167 
In the Jimi Hendrix hypothetical, the element of deception is 
questionable.168 Nevertheless, in light of such cases as Midler, Waits, 
and Prima, a plaintiff suing an advertiser that imitated the plaintiff’s 
instrumental sound would want to assert a claim for false endorsement, 




164 See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 4:75; see also Dangelo, supra note 154, at 
522. 
165 Cf. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463–64 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(recognizing misappropriation through imitation of a singer’s voice). 
166 See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 2:1. 
167 Cf. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1106–11 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming 
that imitation of a singing voice was actionable under § 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act). 
168 See discussion supra Part III.A.3. 
